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DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL. By
FRED W. FRIENDLY. New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. 325.
$6.95.
Roscoe L. Barrow t
Fred Friendly's Due to Circumstances Beyond Our Control is
both a creative television journalist's commentary on the lack of responsibility of network managers in serving the communications
function of broadcasting and a sensitive tribute to the late Edward R.
Murrow, with whom Friendly was associated in producing the outstanding example of broadcasting journalism, "See It Now." The
setting is Friendly's tenure as President of CBS News and the events
leading to his resignation from that position. That resignation was
characterized by one journal as "a tempest in a TV pot." Actually,
it was a self-immolative protest against the tidal wave of commercialism
which had inundated broadcasting's communications function.
Friendly's appreciation of the social service potential of broadcasting journalism is enhanced by the impact on public opinion of the
"See It Now" documentaries relating to McCarthyism. Friendly's
book would be highly meritorious if it did no more than remind us of
the spectre of fear which hovered over the shoulders of a free people
during the McCarthy era and of how these courageous documentaries
helped to dispel fear and restore reason. Loyalty and security were
rated among the highest societal values, and the blacklist became a
common guide in the broadcasting industry. Leaders in government,
not even excepting President Eisenhower, became targets of the "pink"
smear and many officials tailored their decision-making to the necessity
of maintaining a safe margin against attacks on their loyalty. In this
atmosphere, it required great courage to uncloak McCarthy in a television documentary. The response of Murrow and Friendly to this
crisis may have been broadcasting's finest hour. As stated in the
Freedom House Award to Murrow, "Free men were heartened by his
courage in exposing those who would divide us by exploiting our fears."
The immediate events prompting Friendly's resignation as
President of CBS News were the transfer of authority to make news
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judgments from the highest to an intermediate echelon of the management of the CBS network and a judgment by this lower-level official
that important testimony on the Vietnam war should not be broadcast
live. Friendly deemed it of vital importance that news judgments be
made at the highest echelon of management and he evaluated the
Vietnam war issue as among the most important of our time. An
understanding of the significance of his resignation requires an understanding of the importance of the level on which news judgments are
made and the timeliness of the testimony on Vietnam.
Since a network is operated for profit, news must compete with
commercial entertainment programs for exhibition over the network.
When a decision is made to broadcast a special news event, regularly
scheduled commercial programming is displaced. This entails substantial loss of revenue both to the network and to its affiliated stations.
Thus, unless an earth-shaking event is involved, the network must
weigh the economic factor against the public need. A network's sales
department is primarily interested in profit and secondarily in news;
a network's news department is primarily interested in news and
secondarily in profit. Moreover, advertisers and their agencies complain about preemption of their time by special news events. Disagreement between the sales and news departments on news judgments is
therefore to be expected. Throughout the Murrow-Friendly period
at CBS, differences on news judgments were settled in conference with
President Stanton and Chairman Paley. Friendly accepted the presidency of CBS News with the understanding that the news organization
would be autonomous and that Friendly would report only to President
Stanton and Chairman Paley. However, during the controversy over
live coverage of testimony on the Vietnam war, CBS created a new
position, a "Group Vice-President" who had supervision of all broadcast operations. Henceforth, conflicts between the sales and news
departments regarding broadcasts of special news events would be
resolved at this level and Stanton and Paley would not participate in
the decisions.
It is doubtful that a substantial difference in news judgments
would result from vesting in an executive immediately below the
president of the network the function of deciding whether regularly
scheduled entertainment should be displaced by special news events.
Appreciation of the differing societal values represented by mass-appeal
entertainment and news and public affairs programming suggests that
the decision as to whether regular entertainment time should be preempted by news and public affairs programming should be made by
the news department itself. If disagreements between the news and
sales departments are to be resolved at a higher executive level, corporate policy presumably would be followed and the decisions would
be the same regardless of whether they were made by the highest or
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second highest officer of the network. If the responsible official has
a strong background in news and public affairs programming, sounder
news judgments might be expected. At the time of Friendly's resignation, the position of Group Vice-President had existed for only a short
time and the potential impact of this new position on news judgments
was not clear. Vesting news judgments in the intermediate position
probably represented a judgment by the President and Chairman of
CBS that corporate policy and the line of judgment previously followed
by the top echelon of management would be executed by the Group
Vice-President.
The context of the decision that significant testimony on the
Vietnam war should not be broadcast live is as follows. In early
February 1966, CBS made several broadcasts relating to Vietnam.
Included was live coverage of the testimony of Administrator Bell and
General Gavin in hearings on Vietnam and of the return of President
Johnson from a conference with General Ky. At this point in the
hearings on Vietnam, George Kennan, former Ambassador to Russia
and the major exponent of the diplomacy of containment, was scheduled
to testify. Escalation or deescalation of the Vietnam war hung in the
balance. Friendly felt that journalism was failing to communicate to
the people the complexities of the Vietnam war and that Kennan's
testimony would be most helpful to the public and to President Johnson
in deciding whether to escalate the war. However, in making the news
judgment whether to carry the Kennan testimony live, the network
looked ahead to the forthcoming testimony by General Taylor and
Secretary Rusk, anticipating that CBS News would request live
coverage of this testimony. Additionally, the NBC network broadcast
the Kennan testimony live and edited versions could have been included
by CBS in its regular news broadcasts. The preempting of soap operas
and game shows by the Kennan testimony would have resulted in substantial loss of revenue by CBS and its affiliates. For these reasons,
the Group Vice-President vetoed live broadcast of the Kennan
testimony.
A refusal to broadcast live Congressional hearings is not per se
an unsound news judgment. In the round, extensive Congressional
hearings are dull. For each minute of significant testimony, much time
is spent on inconsequential matters. If the testimony is not interesting
and significant, there is quick loss of audience. In some instances, the
best result may be obtained by cutting in and out of hearings when
the reporter on the scene senses that important testimony is to be
presented. In other instances, edited versions of Congressional hearings, with appropriate comments, may serve best. It is the importance
of the hearings and of the specific testimony which determines the
form which the broadcast should take. Friendly deemed the Vietnam
hearings to be of the highest importance and Kennan's testimony to
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be crucial. Clearly, Friendly's judgment as to the importance of
hearings on the escalation or deescalation of the Vietnam war was
sound. The next Presidential election will probably turn on precisely
that issue. Whether the Kennan testimony was a crucial part of the
hearings is not as clear. However, the head of the news department of
a network is in a better position to make that judgment than any
other executive in the network organization.
Friendly relates in his book a number of news decisions involving
unhappiness on the part of advertisers and network officials. From
these experiences, Friendly concluded that the Group Vice-President's
decision on the Kennan testimony evidenced the future pattern for
news judgments. The factual basis for such a conclusion would have
been more evident if Friendly had included annual data on time devoted
by CBS and other networks to news and public affairs programming
during the years that he was associated with CBS. Some think that
such data would show an increase in the time devoted by CBS to news
and public affairs programming and a favorable comparison with the
time devoted to such programming by other networks.
Friendly, in the tradition of Murrow's journalism, appreciated
that television is today the most persistent force in shaping the minds
of the people and may determine ultimately what kind of people we are.
Sensitive to his responsibility as a journalist to fulfill the social need
for information on the great issues of our time, and lacking the desired
support of his superiors at CBS, Friendly resigned as a matter of
conscience. No doubt he hoped that, through his example, network
managers might be prompted to give a greater role in making news
judgments to broadcasting's Fourth Estate. There was considerable
public reaction to Friendly's resignation. And the resignation had
some immediate impact: CBS carried a live broadcast of the testimony of General Taylor and Secretary Rusk on Vietnam. However,
these broadcasts reduced the clamor surrounding Friendly's resignation
and the incident may soon be forgotten. With the return to business
as usual, it may be anticipated that the economic factor will again be
given the greater weight in news judgments.1
It was as NBC was broadcasting live the testimony of Kennan
on Vietnam and CBS was broadcasting a fifth rerun of "I Love Lucy"
followed by a seventh rerun of "The Real McCoys" that Friendly's
thoughts began to run to Due To CircumstancesBeyond Our Control.
1 Recently, Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in public hearings on the Vietnam war-his first public testimony before the committee in nearly two years. N.B.C. broadcast the hearings;
C.B.S. did not. C.B.S. justified its decision on the ground that duplication of N.B.C.'s
coverage would have served no useful function. See NEvswEEK, March 25, 1968, at
97. But "[i]f you take yourself seriously as a transmitter of news, you run the damn
hearings anyway-that is, if there is a 'you' who is capable of feeling seriously about
such matters, and not just a piece of machinery gulping down profit-and-loss statements." THE NEW YORKER, March 30, 1968, at 127.
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The title suggests that the circumstances which lead to broadcasts of
entertainment appealing to the lowest common denominator, and to
judgments to exclude live broadcasts of significant news events, are
beyond the control of society. Thus, an epilogue entitled "The Beginning: Circumstances Within Our Control" treats only the concept of
a non-commercial public service network. At various points in the
book Friendly expresses admiration for President Stanton and Chairman Paley and excuses their part in the circumstances leading to his
resignation. Friendly believes that the position of Group VicePresident was created because Stanton and Paley found it unpleasant
to debate or to deny a request by CBS News to broadcast a special
news event. Since CBS stock is sold to the public and since the price
of shares fluctuates with the ratings, the managers must favor massappeal entertainment. Even Group Vice-President Schneider is not
deemed a villain but only a cog in a machine which has run wild.
To excuse those whose actions, in Friendly's view, gave him no realistic alternative to resigning his position of important journalistic
service reveals the gentle side of Friendly's character. However, the
theme that television's failure to fulfill social needs is an inevitable
product of the system and that network managers are not at fault is of
questionable soundness. If the theme were sound, news judgments
would be the same whether the decisions were made by the top or
intermediate echelons of network management. And in that event, the
reasons given by Friendly to explain his resignation would not justify
his action.
Any system is an instrument designed to facilitate the achievement
of prescribed goals. The network's primary goal is to serve as an
effective marketing instrument. Network managers, on behalf of masscirculation-minded advertisers and advertising agencies, provide programming which fulfills advertising needs. Far from running wild,
the network system is under control and operating efficiently. However, the hand on the network switch has a moral responsibility to
direct the network system so as to fulfill social needs: networks are the
primary program source for broadcasters, and broadcasters are trustees
of publicly-owned airways, licensed to serve the public interest. The
failure of the networks to fulfill social needs stems from the goals of
the networks, which are set by the network managers. They, and
not the system, are responsible for the character of the program service.
It is of great importance, as Friendly suggests, that there be
established a non-commercial, public service network. This must not,
however, become the occasion for even further relaxation of the publicinterest standard applied to commercial broadcasting stations. Increased emphasis, in network programming, on the "animal" end of
the emotional scale will lead our people further on the road from the
civilized to the primitive. To assure that commercial stations serve
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the public interest, the networks should be regulated directly and the
public-interest standard applied to them.2 In short, the primary goal
of the networks should be changed by law from the marketing function
to the communications function.
Friendly's book does not treat the potential impact on television
programming of the all-channel receiver, the development of UHF,
subscription television, CATV, and broadcasting via satellite. Hence,
these developments are not appropriate topics for discussion in this
review. Suffice it to say that each of them will contribute new problems but will not solve the problem of the influence of television's
marketing function on the character of television programming.
Friendly, our most sophisticated television journalist, has apparently concluded that the power of the network structure is so great
that commercial television cannot be controlled and that only a noncommercial, public service television system is an available alternative.
There is much evidence to support this position. Like most industryoriented regulatory agencies, the FCC tends to view broadcasting
problems through the eyes of the industry more than through the eyes
of the public. The broadcasting industry mounts a strong lobby in
the Congress, many members of which appreciate the importance at
election time of holding the goodwill of the media. Recent exercise by
the President of his power of appointment has reflected a judgment to
leave commercial broadcasting as it is for the present. Yet, Friendly's
resignation, as a conscientious protest against the subordination of
communications to advertising in network decision-making, had significant temporary impact. If others who are concerned that a free
society be informed on the critical problems of our time were willing
to make a tenth of the sacrifice that Friendly did, balanced program
service in television 3 might be achieved.
2 A bill providing for the regulation of networks in the public interest was intro-

duced in the Congress in 1961 and at that time had FCC approval.

Later the FCC

suggested that consideration of the bill be delayed and no action by the Congress has
been taken. See S. 2400, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) and Comments of the FCC
on H.R. 11340, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960), both reproduced in H.R. REP. No. 281,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 184-86, 176-84 (1961).
3 For an analysis of proposals for attaining balanced program service in commercial television, see Barrow, The Attainment of Balanwed Program Service in Tele-

vision, 52 VA. L. REv. 633 (1966).
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CONTRACTING FOR ATOMS. By HAROLD ORLANS. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xvii, 242.
$6.00.
Richard L. Chapman
Contracting for Atoms is a political-as distinguished from a

legal-study of the Atomic Energy Commission's contracting for
research and development. According to the foreword, "This study is
concerned with public policy issues posed by the Atomic Energy
Commission's contracting with private organizations for research and
development and for the management of government-owned nuclear
plants and laboratories." (P. vii.)
The author divides his study into three parts. The first, constituting about sixty percent of the volume, deals with contract policies
and practices. The remaining two parts, setting out the dramatis
personae (a political view of the principal parties) and detailing the
author's conclusions, pose more interesting general public policy issues:
how the federal government should promote nuclear research and its
civilian applications without undue restrictions, without interference
with the higher-priority requirements of military applications, and
without aiding and abetting a technologically-based private monopoly.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), created by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, inherited from the Army a nuclear enterprise
designed to meet wartime exigencies, and which emphasized security
and urgency above all else. The AEC fell heir to an operation exclusively directed towards military purposes, where industrial participation had been limited to a few large corporations, where security
prevented the flow of technical participation to other potential participants, and where contract procedures were few and informal. The
Act, however, also was intended to strengthen free competition and
private enterprise.
The result was what Orlans terms "technology by contract." Most
of the research and operating expertise was outside the government in
a few industries and universities. Even as late as 1964 over half of
the contract dollars and manpower were allocated to seven industrial
and university contractors. Orlans concedes that this concentration
may have been necessary during World War II and may have contributed to the substantial success in the development of atomic energy
for military purposes. But he questions whether such concentration
may have impeded the development of civilian nuclear technologyespecially central-station electrical power.
t Executive Secretary, Grants Associates Program, National Institutes of Health.
B.S. 1954, South Dakota State University; M.P.A. 1958, Ph.D. 1967, Syracuse
University.
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Finally recognizing the difficulties of trying to encourage civilian
application from a very restricted private industrial base, the AEC,
beginning in 1963, made some modest attempts to encourage broader
participation. This was done by deliberately changing contractors and
by replacing single prime contractors with multiple contractors through
segmenting development and production tasks. Even so, those contractors that first became involved in the weapons-development process
had the built-in advantages of experience and knowledge obtained
under the protective cloak of a tight security system that has been
relaxed only slightly to permit more extensive civilian application.
The AEC still seems wedded to the practice of contracting for its
research, development and operations. One could reasonably raise the
question as to whether or not the AEC should establish some topquality government-operated and manned laboratories, if only as a
quality control and regulatory measure. The AEC also continues
to look to industry for the operation of its production plants and
development laboratories while contracting with universities for basic
and applied research. Is this a dangerous and unnatural split between
research and operations? Although Orlans does not discuss this
specific point, it may partly account for complaints that progress in
the industrial application of atomic energy has been slow, and that
university researchers show little interest in research that may have
practical value. Of course, a principal factor has been the lower
funding priority allocated to industrial application compared to either
basic research or weapons development.
Part Two describes the character and influence of the five principal
groups which have had a hand in American nuclear policy: the Atomic
Energy Commission itself, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
the Department of Defense, scientists, and industry.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created both the Commission
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the Congress. Over
the years the Joint Committee has taken advantage of its special legislative responsibility to become the most powerful force in the determination of American nuclear policy. Orlans characterizes the Joint
Committee as aggressive and risk-taking, especially in pushing new
military applications such as the hydrogen bomb and the naval reactor
program. The committee's influence has extended to such detailed
considerations as specific contract awards. Indeed, Orlans reports
contractor complaints to the effect that major contract changes must
first be checked out with the committee staff before the AEC can
implement them.
Many people have questioned whether the commission form of
administration still has any utility. Certainly, from the viewpoint of
the President, atomic energy matters could be controlled more easily
and with less congressional "interference" were the Commission to be
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replaced by a single administrator. Moreover, doing away with the
Commission would make it easier to fix responsibility which at present,
as Orlans reports, is so dispersed that outsiders can rarely find the
particular administrative official or commissioner behind an administration action.
The primary influence of the Department of Defense has been
exerted through the initiation of military requirements for atomic
weapons. Some observers believe that the practice of permitting the
military to levy requirements without having to "pay" for them
through their own budget has encouraged the military to be extravagant
in stating their "needs" and has prevented the AEC from allocating
more funds to civilian technology. In joint endeavors, such as the
aircraft nuclear reactor program carried on with the Air Force, Orlans
characterizes the AEC as being somewhat naive in failing to keep in
touch with the "realities" of the technological and operational context
in which a nuclear technology is supposed to contribute. As a result, he
believes, the AEC gets left holding the bag-financially and politicallywhen these projects fail.
Orlans suggests that the principal influence of the nuclear scientists
has been in American nuclear weapons policy with respect to weapons
choice and strategy.1 The AEC's General Advisory Committee, composed of atomic scientists and engineers, had a significant influence on
AEC policy until 1952 when there was a substantial falling-out among
members over the development of the H-bomb and the subsequent
investigation of and denial of a security clearance to the late Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer. These same scientists have also been influential
in Defense Department research and development policy. Every
Director of Defense Research and Engineering since 1958 has been
taken from among the "high priests" who were formerly engaged in
the contract atomic weapons laboratories. Industrial influence has
been reflected primarily in the AEC's avowed policy since 1963 of
permitting broader participation in AEC contracts and wider distribution of atomic energy information.
Orlans also raises two issues which need further study and
resolution. The first concerns the AEC's future role in high-energy
physics research. As more of this research becomes less obviously
oriented toward military application and partakes more of the nature
usually considered appropriate for support by the National Science
Foundation, Orlans questions whether it should be moved to the
NSF. There is little likelihood, however, that the National Science
Foundation will pick up the principal responsibility for the support
of high-energy research if only because the current level of AEC support for high-energy physics approximates the total NSF budget.
3 For a full discussion, see R. Gina'IN,
WE"Ao

s PouLc" (1962).
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Political realities-especially in the House Appropriations Committeebeing what they are, such a change is impossible without the backing
of most of the top scientific policy advisors. With the "high priesthood" of nuclear scientists well entrenched throughout the scientific
policy advisory mechanism in the federal government, this type of
change does not seem to be even remotely possible.
The second issue relates to the future of the AEC and its laboratories more generally. Orlans asks whether the AEC has outlived its
purpose by largely accomplishing its original mission to provide
modern nuclear weapons and the necessary base for civilian industrial
application of nuclear energy. Although a good argument might be
made for the distribution of AEC functions among the Department
of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, and the
Federal Power Commission, the burden of increased expenditures
placed on those agencies acquiring AEC functions probably would not
be welcomed. Moreover, if one were to seriously consider dismantling
the AEC, one would have to obtain the support of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, which is not likely to put itself out of business.
Orlans' study is a contribution to better understanding of the
forces and the broad issues of public policy involved in the AEC's
contracting for research and" development. However, as Orlans has
said, the last two parts of the book were written retrospectively, while
the first part was meant to fit into a larger study of political and
management aspects of federal research and development contracting
and contract administration generally. Because of this the book lacks
the continuity that would make it more useful and that would have
been achieved if the general political considerations raised in Parts Two
and Three had been woven into a broader discussion of the contract
policies and practices presented in Part One.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON OWNERSHIP AND DEBy JAN KRASNOWIECKL
VELOPMENT OF LAND.
Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1965. Pp. xxix, 846. $11.50.
Charles J. Meyers t

For those who know Professor Krasnowiecki's other work, this
casebook will be a disappointment. Two years' experience in the
classroom with the book has left me with the view that it is conventional in conception and routine, when not faulty in execution. Some
parts are to be excepted from this harsh appraisal, but the good does
not overcome the bad.
The subject matter of the book, by and large, is the staple fare
of first year property: a smattering of the historical development of
property law (20 pages including a case applying the Rule in Shelley's
Case), adverse possession, possessory freehold estates, landlord and
tenant, concurrent ownership, gifts, elementary future interests, real
covenants, equitable servitudes, land use controls, easements and a
little vendor and purchaser. Some less familiar material appears in
the body of the book and in the appendices: remedies for the recovery
of land, water rights, urban renewal and eminent domain, advanced
zoning problems, condominiums and cooperatives, and fair housing.
The exclusions from the book are a good deal more interesting
than the inclusions. The whole subject of conveyancing-form, execution and delivery of deeds, legal descriptions and even recordation-is
virtually ignored. This is an audacious move. Professor Leach probably expressed a common opinion about the recording acts in his
dissenting preface to the Casner and Leach casebook when he said:
The recording material is, to my mind, the important item.
• . . It is the core of our modern land system.
I want my students to meet the recording cases-and all the
real property doctrine with which those cases deal-at the
earliest practicable time.

.

.

.

It seems to me important

that the framework of student thinking should be the registry
of deeds.'
In more innocent days I shared these views, but I no longer
think they are valid, even assuming they were when set down in 1949.
Today the plain fact is that in most urban centers, and in large parts
of the outlands as well, title work is done by title insurance companies.
When lawyers get involved, and they rarely do unless the transaction
t Professor of Law, Stanford University School of Law. B.A. 1949, Rice University. LL.B. 1949, University of Texas. LL.M. 1953, J.S.D. 1964, Columbia University. Member, Texas Bar.
IA. CASNER & W. LEAcH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY xi-xii (1st stand. ed.

1950).
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is a substantial commercial deal, the title problems are rarely those
taught in the conventional chapter on recording: scope of search, wild
deeds, bona fide purchase and the rule of shelter. The questions are
much more likely to involve undischarged liens, unprobated wills,
heirship, invalid tax sales and the like. About the only purpose I can
see in a detailed examination of the recording acts and the operation
of the state-maintained registry of deeds is as an object lesson to the
profession: adopt such onerous rules of search as those of Woods v.
Garnett,2 Tefft v. Munson,3 and Finley v. Glenn; ' establish such a
creaky mechanism for searching title as grantee-grantor and grantorgrantee indexes (often lacking even brief descriptions of the property) ;
neglect to provide the customer with protection against mistakes-and
someone will come along with a better mousetrap. If this lesson is
worth teaching, and I'm not sure it is, it can be taught in far fewer
pages of very time-consuming cases than appear in Casner and Leach
(125 pages) and other orthodox casebooks. So I salute Professor
Krasnowiecki for seeing the obvious (which is so often overlooked)
and for doing something about it. If he had been like most of us, he
would have retained this obsolete material and justified himself by the
Latin argument that it's good for the mind. Instead he threw it out.
I doubt, however, that the need to prune the recording act materials should lead to the extirpation of the whole subject of conveyancing. Some notion of the form and purpose of a deed, of the
difficulties that can arise in drafting and interpreting legal descriptions,
of the effect of reservations and exceptions, and of the pitfalls of the
family transaction where papa hands over a deed to take effect on his
death (or worse, doesn't hand it over)-all of which can be treated
in 20 to 30 pages with a few principal cases and a number of problems-are topics worth knowing about if the time cost is modest.
The omission of this material by Professor Krasnowiecki is odd, for
he does have a brief treatment of contracts for the sale of land. But
this comes in the last chapter of the book proper and seems unrelated
to anything on either side of it. One gets the uncomfortable impression that Professor Krasnowiecki had once decided to leave out
both vendor and purchaser and conveyancing but at the last moment
tacked on a little vendor and purchaser.
Given an editor with the boldness to delete the recording materials, we might have hoped for the deletion of elementary future
interests as well. But here we are disappointed. About 40 pages are
devoted to this archaic (and arcane) material. While this may seem
like a modest allocation, I would guess that it is a very slow 40 pages
indeed. (I did not teach this material in Krasnowiecki, for reasons
that will appear, but I have taught the same stuff in other casebooks
2 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894).

357 N.Y. 97 (1874).
4 303 Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931).
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and have always found it slow going.) The hoary common-law rules
are set out in abundance, with examples: the destructibility of contingent remainders, conveyances to uses, the Statute of Uses. future
interests and conveyancing under the Statute of Uses (the latter an
unworthy exception to the elimination of the subject of conveyancing),
executory interests, classification of remainders, the Rule in Shelley's
case (again!) and the Doctrine of the Worthier Title.
In my view this material should not be taught in the first year.
If the purpose is to teach legal history, it is a misbegotten effort, for
students cannot look at five centuries of history in five or ten hours
and be expected to see anything. Moreover, to study 40 pages (or
140 pages) of feudal land law as legal history is worse than an innocent
masquerade, for it is to study legal change without reference to the
social, economic, and political causes of the change. The Latin argument simply won't do here. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to lay
a foundation for advanced courses in Trusts and Future Interests, the
material, so far as it is relevant to such courses, is far better taught
there-as editors of casebooks on the subject recognize, for they all
repeat coverage of topics having contemporary significance, such as
classification of remainders. In surveying Professor Krasnowiecki's
concept of a first-year property course, we find, then, some innovation
in cutting back of obsolescent material, but a failure to wield the shears
boldly enough to get it all.
By way of additions, Professor Krasnowiecki has included topics
of current interest and concern: planned unit development, condominiums and cooperatives, and fair housing. Regrettably, his treatment of the last two subjects exhibits the helter-skelter organization
and slipshod execution that characterize much of the book. For instance, Appendix F, on Fair Housing, begins with Shelley v. Kraemer,'
with "Kraemer" misspelled both in the caption of the case and in the
editor's footnote to the caption. Then follows a note on Barrows v.
Jackson,' the only other Supreme Court opinion cited. The questions
following the principal case and the note raise interesting problems
of the rationale of Shelley, but they fall short of probing the essence of
that troublesome case. They inquire into the power of the landlord to
terminate a leasehold that is assigned to a Negro in violation of a
standard (nondiscriminatory) covenant against assignment or subletting, into the termination by notice of a periodic tenancy when there
has been a transfer to a Negro, and into the use of a possibility of
reverter to avoid Shelley v. Kraemer. The opportunity to take a hard
look at Shelley was missed, however, by relegating it to an appendix
and by using CharlottePark and Recreation Commission v. Barringer7
earlier (at page 141) to illustrate the consequences of classifying in5334 U.S. 1 (1948).

6346 U.S. 249 (1953).
7242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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terests as possibilities of reverter or rights of re-entry.

In Barringer,

donor gave a park to the city so long as Negroes were excluded from
it. Negroes thereafter claimed the right to use the park, precipitating
litigation in which the donor asserted that the property would revert
to him under the special limitation if Negroes were admitted to the
premises. The donor won, but for the wrong reason. A plausible
ground for holding for the donor is that Shelley v. Kraemer still permits
state action to enforce an individual's discriminatory desire not to give
land to the public for racially integrated parks. Regardless of how this
contention might fare in the Supreme Court, consideration of it adds
depth to the discussion of Shelley. Professor Krasnowiecki's questions,
on the other hand, submerge the student in problems of proof of the
landlord's discriminatory conduct, when the matter of principal concern at this point is one not of proof but of policy-to what extent
the state can lend its support to an individual's desire to practice racial
discrimination.
Of course when the class reaches the Fair Housing Appendix one
can go back and redo the Barringercase, but the subsequent discussion
will necessarily upset most of what was said before. From the
students' standpoint, this is the old shell game with a vengeance. Or,
one can take up the Fair Housing Appendix when Barringer is first
encountered, but this is a strange slice of meat to sandwich between the
fee simple determinable and the fee simple upon condition subsequent.
The remainder of the Fair Housing Appendix consists of a reprint of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and six questions
about it, together with a question on the constitutionality of fairhousing statutes which apply to government-assisted housing but not
to other housing. In my opinion this is an inadequate treatment of
the subject. Rather than reprint verbatim one statute, it would be
far better to take up the problems faced by a draftsman of fair housing
legislation through the examination of various statutory approaches to
the problem. These problems include the types of housing accommodations to be covered, the persons to be covered (for example, real estate
brokers? bankers?), enforcement procedures and judicial review. Even
more important is some discussion of the experience of the states with
fair housing legislation-why, in short, hasn't it worked.
Perhaps the comments above do not justify my broad indictment
of the workmanship in the book. I am concerned about fair housing
and this concern may prompt me to expect more in the book than
either the editor or the typical user thinks is desirable. I believe, however, that the evidence about to be adduced will, at the least, establish
that the galleys were not proofread (a serious default for a lawyer)
and will make a prima facie case that the overall workmanship is sloppy.
Typographical errors abound. Some are serious enough to require correction in advance of class so that the reading will be compre-
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9
hensible0 Others are sources of confusion, and some are merely
0
annoying." The examples given in the footnotes are illustrative, not
exhaustive.
Some of the cases were poor choices, and others were poorly
edited. Why include two long cases, aggregating 15 pages, on the
duty of an occupying cotenant to account to cotenants out of possession? 11 Similarly, the case of Picconi v. Carlin 12 adds almost nothing
to what has already been considered in Cohen v. Simpson Real Estate
4
Corp., 3 Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'r Corp., and Klein
v. Dove,' 5 -all of which deal with the creation of private and public
easements when a purchaser buys by reference to a plat, and with the
modes of extinguishing such private rights. The case of King v.
Firm 16 is too long, the facts too complex and the opinion insufficiently
instructive to justify its use to make the simple point that duties arising
under a lease are independent of other obligations of the parties to one
another. The opinion in Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Seminary "
is so abominable that no first year student should be encouraged to
know that workmanship of such quality is produced by the courts.
Other instances of bad judgment or carelessness in editing include
undue attention to the peculiarities of Pennsylvania procedure in
zoning cases, a complex subject having little general application,'" and
the omission in the zoning chapter of the problem of nonconforming
uses and their elimination through amortization. A small but vexing
gaffe appears on page 444. Here in a footnote Professor Krasnowiecki
has cited seven cases that follow the rule of the principal case, three
of which are from New York, two from the Appellate Division (dating
back to the 1920's) and one from the Supreme Court, which, it must
be remembered, is just a trial court. Three more cases are cited in
the footnote-another from the New York Supreme Court, which the
student is directed to "compare, however," with the earlier New York
Supreme Court case, and two from California. The latter appear
parenthetically and confusingly in the middle of the string and apparently are cited because a student case note writer in the Hastings
Law Journal cited them as not following the rule of the principal case,
8 See pp. 36, 221, 247, 342.
9 See pp. 66 (reference to the Allen case in the notes apparently intended to be
a reference to the principal case, Allot) ; 71 (reference to Mullen v. Mullen in the
notes intended to refer to Mellen v. Mellen, cited in principal case); 160 (cause
should be clause) ; 161 (case should be lease) ; 403 (date wrong and word omitted)
471 (right of duty for right of re-entry).
10 See pp. 339 (illusery for illusory) ; 531 (euphainism for eupheinism).
11
The two cases, reprinted pp. 276-90, are McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wash. 2d
391, 143 P.7d 307 (1943), and Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E.2d 77

(1952).
1240 N.J. Super. 393, 123 A.2d 87 (Super. Ct L. Div. 1956) (p. 598).
13 385 Pa. 352, 123 A.2d 715 (1956) (p. 569).
14 22 N.J. 119, 123 A.2d 511 (1956) (cited in note, p. 572).
15205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (p. 573).
163 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955) (p. 200).
171 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 140 N.E.2d 577 (C.P. 1956) (p. 467).
38 See pp. 502, 512, 524-26.
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a citation which Professor Krasnowiecki thinks is wrong. What is a
student-or a teacher, for that matter-to make of all this? Should
he see if the two New York Supreme Court cases are in disagreement,
though distinguishable? Should he read the Hastings Law Journal
case note to see if the student writer really did take the position
attributed to him, and if so, should the diligent student then read the
cases themselves to see who is right-Professor Krasnowiecki or the
case note writer? Does anybody care? What seemingly happened is
that Professor Krasnowiecki, with scissors, paste and only the slightest
revision, transferred his work in footnote 14 on page 312 of The Homes
Association Handbook 12 to his casebook. There is little excuse for
string citation footnotes in casebooks under any circumstances, but
none whatever for such a footnote taken from a handbook whose purpose is to "serve as a practical guide to those actively involved in
neighborhood planning, development, and administration." 20 Presumably such people find helpful a complete rundown of the authorities;
students do not.
Lastly in this catalogue of editing errors, I ought to mention
lapses of syntax and style. Compare the formality of the prose on
page 402 21 with the informality-not to say exuberance-of that on
pages 4462 and 604.'

Consider also the grammar on page 4894

Occasionally, Professor Krasnowiecki states propositions that
he may truly mean to assert but that seem rather to be an unintended
by-product of stylistic ornamentation. Thus, he says: "The opinion
in Spencer's Case (or what we have of it through its faithful reporter)
did not expand on the meaning of these requirements [of 'privity' and
'touching and concerning']." (P. 397.) Is Professor Krasnowiecki
bestowing an accolade on Lord Coke in general, is he praising Coke's
report of Spencer's Case in particular or is he aware of-and making
an ironic comment on-the dispute over the accuracy of Coke's
report? 25

Finally, misstatements of fact (or law, if you will) are uncomfortably numerous. Page 1: Professor Krasnowiecki divides the
history of land law into two periods: 1066-1699 and 1700 to the
present. Of the second period he says: "A careful study of this period
'2 Urban Land Institute, The Homes Association Handbook (Technical Bulletin

50, 1964).

20 Id. at vi.

2

1"As you proceed through the following materials, keep this [foregoing model]
fact situation in mind and relate the materials to it. It is hoped that you will find it
an interesting exercise."
2 "There is surely some sense to this view. What? Should this view be applied
to every substantial modification made by the common grantor or developer regardless

of other factors?"
23 At page 604, Professor Krasnowiecki muses in the first person singular about
his selection of cases and their location in the book.
24

"Moreover, zoning regulations took as their focal point the individual lot. Since,

it was the individual lot owner's choice that had to be controlled."
after2 all,
5
286, 112 N.E. 679 (1916).
See Purvis v. Shuman, 373 Ill.
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must surely yield the conclusion that the law relating to land has
shown about as much mobility as its subject matter. Thus it happens
that a good portion of our modem land law goes back directly to the
early institutions without any refreshing development in between."
What about the Rule Against Perpetuities which was still in its crib in
1699? Equitable servitudes which date from 1848? Public land use
planning-zoning and subdivision control-which originated in the
20th century? Page 8: "Before 1540 no one could make a will of his
fee or his seignory." A reliable authority states that a principal purpose of conveying land to uses before the Statute of Uses was to
enable the cestui que use to make a will.26 Page 19: "But in feudal
times, under the doctrine of primogeniture, a man could have only one
heir-his eldest child." What if the eldest child was a female with
younger brothers? What if there were no children but a brother surPage 194: in a note to Hermitage Co. v.
vived the decedent?2
Levine 8 Professor Krasnowiecki inquires: "If there is some doubt
whether the landlord may establish his damages immediately rather
than wait to the end of the term, what provision would you insert in
the lease on behalf of the landlord?" Then follow two California
Civil Code sections on liquidated damages and the citation of a Ninth
Circuit case dating from 1934, holding that these sections invalidate a
lease clause measuring landlord's damages by the difference between
the rent reserved for the balance of the term and the fair rental value
of the premises for such period.2 9 Professor Krasnowiecki continues:
"This view of the California law has been confirmed by the California
court in Ricker v. Rombough . . ." (italics mine), citing a decision
of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Alameda
County,3 0 the precedential value of which in California is about the
same as that of the Supreme Court, Special Term, Oneida County, in
New York. Moreover, as Professor Krasnowiecki recognizes parenthetically, the issue before the court is the validity of a rent acceleration
clause, the language relating to loss-of-bargain-damages being dictum.
The plain fact is that, since 1937, California has had a statute authorizing the landlord to recover loss-of-bargain damages if he provides
3
for such remedy in the lease.
Everybody makes mistakes. But this book has too many of
them-and too few compensating advantages-to qualify for classroom
use, at least in its present form. There is, I think, the nucleus of a
satisfactory book here. Chapters 15, 16, and 18, on real covenants,
equitable servitudes and easements, are good. The method of these
chapters, which is to teach the conventional law by reference to modem
26 4 W. HoLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 412, 436-37 (3d ed. 1945).
27 For the medieval law of inheritance, see 3 id. at 171-85 (3d ed. 1923).

8248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928).
Moore v. Investment Properties Corp., 71 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1934).
3 Ricker v. Rombough, 120 Cal. App. 2d 912, 261 P.2d 328 (1953).
CODE § 3308 (West 1954). The error is repeated on page 198.
31 CAL.
29
0
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problems (for example, planned unit development), should be extended
to other chapters. To illustrate what might be done, much of the law
of concurrent estates could be taught by reference to condominiums.
Landlord and tenant might be examined through materials on shopping
center leases, and some elementary income tax law could be introduced
at this point. Another aspect of landlord and tenant-condition of the
premises and constructive eviction-could be examined in a provocative
and profitable way by reference to the problems of slum tenements. The
recent government report on tenants' rights 3 2 would be a good point
of departure. Real property taxation might well be looked into at
this point. A revision of the book aimed at teaching property from this
perspective, eliminating the errors in the present edition and employing
better (and better edited) cases would make a contribution to the field.
The teaching of first year property law has come a long way since
I first studied it from Fraser33 in 1946 and first taught it from Casner
This book benefits from the progress that has
and Leach in 1949.'
been made and adds a measure to it. But much more must be done
if the course is to become responsive to the needs of contemporary
society. And in the process of reform and revision, greater care must
be taken than is apparent in this book to preserve the old-fashioned
virtues of accuracy, clarity and precision.
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Peter H. Dodson t and Peter S. Greenberg "lf
This review, written from a student's perspective, is intended
largely as a response to the preceding review by Professor Meyers.'
It does not endeavor to compare Professor Krasnowiecki's book with
other available property law casebooks or to measure it against any
notions of "ideal" property materials. Rather, it will attempt to
indicate the utility of Professor Krasnowiecki's book in a first year
property course.

At the outset, it must be noted that Professor Meyers' review does
not recognize the central theme propounded by Professor Kras32

TENANTS' RIGHTS: LEGAL TOOLS FOR BErrER HOUSING

(U.S. Govt. Printing

Office, 1967).

33 1 E. FRASER, CASES AND READINGS ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1941).
34 A. CASxER & W. LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY (rev. temp. ed. 1948).

t Comment Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
t-

Editor-in-Chief, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
1Meyers, Book Review, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 742 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Meyers].
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nowiecki's book. The casebook's recurrent focus on the remedies and
procedures available to real property owners brings into sharp relief
the difficulties inherent in applying ancient property concepts to modern
land-use problems.' Thus, what Professor Meyers characterizes as
"the staple fare of first year property" - becomes significant at two
levels. Not only does Professor Krasnowiecki respond to the functional
need to teach the "rules" necessary to the student's property law learning, but his case selection also gives insight into the fundamental
difficulties he sees with contemporary land law.
The early chapters clearly evince the casebook's two structural
levels. The first chapter, "The Ghost of Feudalism," introduces the
ancient heritage with which the student must contend.' The inclusion
of Bishop v. Williams,' involving the Rule in Shelley's Case, allows an
important point to be made early in the game: even though the Rule
has been abolished in most jurisdictions, its demise is prospective and
its influence and practical importance may linger.'
The relevance of this learning extends beyond the Rule itself.'
In chapter two, Professor Krasnowiecki frames his approach by observing that "one cannot speak confidently of ownership or of other
interests in property until one has examined the remedies available for
their protection." 8 Therefore, the materials focus upon the remedies
and procedures for defending title and draw the line between traditional
actions at law (ejectment) and equity (quiet title), placing both in
historical context. Allott 9 thus gives perspective to an analysis of the
quiet title remedy by causing the student to consider that little practical
protection is provided a property owner if the courts will remove only
written clouds on title, since potential buyers may be as easily frightened
by oral claims. Further, Allott and its extensive notes focus attention
on the broader need for an expanded reformation remedy to ensure that
apparent "rights" receive judicial protection. Finally, Professor
2

"Knowledge of the remedies, of course, is fundamental to effective practice in
any 3field of law." (P. 21.)
Meyers, at 742.
4 It is Professor Krasnowiecki's position that "a good portion of our modern
land law goes back directly to the early institutions without any refreshing development in between." (P. 1.)
Professor Meyers' criticism, Meyers, at 747-48, is hard to explain in light of Professor Krasnowiecki's use of "a good portion," a term which clearly envisions exceptions.
5221 Ark. 617, 255 S.W.2d 171 (1953). (P. 14.)
6 This is the thrust of the questions directed at property's "chain of title" which
Professor Krasnowiecki poses in notes 2 and 4 at page 17.
7 Professor Krasnowiecki writes: "A critical approach to modern property law
must begin with an understanding of its original function. . . . The Rule in Shelley's
Case . . . serves as a good example of [feudal property] law's unreasoned survival
into the present century." (P. 21.)
8 (P. 21.) Professor Krasnowiecki provocatively reverses the Latin maxim to
read "Ubi remedium, ibi jus." (P. 22). The casebook's approach thus integrates
the "innovative" view that increasing public regulation yields a "diminishing fee."
Compare P. 21 n.3 with C. BERGER, LAND OwNmsHIP AND LAND USE 1-32, 32 nn.2-4
(1968).
9 Allott v. American Strawboard Co., 237 Ill. 55, 86 N.E. 685 (1908). (P. 60.)
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Krasnowiecki indicates how modern statutory procedures fusing law
and equity may create uncomfortable bedfellows which further complicate title defenses.' °
The chapter on adverse possession develops this analysis, permitting evaluation of the judge-made "rules" designed to implement the
underlying policies of statutes of limitations." Goen v. Sansbury 12 sets
out the basic case law and the cases which follow present important
variants. For example, one who purchases from an adverse possessor
may take apparent "rights" in property which later prove to be contingent upon the adverse possessor's mental state during the time the
latter was in possession. 3 The Day '4 case discloses again the importance of the remedy (here, quiet title) in making viable the "right"
established by the adverse possessor.
The learning of these early chapters provides a thread which runs
throughout the book, giving important insights in different contexts.
For example, University Gardens' 5 may be used to challenge the
appropriateness of requiring a bond for a temporary injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant. University Gardens also compels one
to question whether a plaintiff's failure to seek a temporary restraining
order should be relevant to the granting of a permanent injunction.'
The need for effective remedies to protect property "interests" also is
apparent in the eminent domain standing cases.. 7 In these cases,
Professor Krasnowiecki sees judicial confusion of rights and remedies,
especially in light of the courts' willingness to allow challenges based on
treatment of adjoining property in the zoning area.'
As to zoning
itself, the point is made that procedural difficulties and delays effectively
may limit as much as does the substantive law the "rights" of property
owners.' 9 Once the importance of procedural considerations is appreciated, Professor Meyers' criticism that the casebook pays "undue
attention to the peculiarities of Pennsylvania procedure in zoning cases,
a complex subject having little general application" " is seen to be
unjustified. Rather, the very complexity of the Pennsylvania pro10

See White v. Young, 409 Pa. 562, 186 A.2d 919 (1963). (P. 80.)
"1 (P. 90.)
12219 Md. 289, 149 A.2d 17 (1959). (P. 91.)
13 See Predham v. Holfester, 32 N.J. Super. 419, 108 A.2d 458 (1954).

(P. 95.)

Predham profitably can be compared with Vlachos v. Witherow, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d
698 (C.P. Wash. County 1952), aff'd per curiam, 383 Pa. 174, 118 A.2d 174 (1955),
(P. 102.), where the "mental element" test seems necessary to protect a grantee.
'4 Day v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 51 R.I. 213, 153 A. 312 (1931).

(P. 115.)

1University Gardens Property Owners Ass'n v. Schultz, 71 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup.

Ct), modified per curiam, 272 App. Div. 949, 71 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1947).
16
This is the thrust of notes 1-3. (Pp. 451-52.)
17

(Pp. 448, 451.)

E.g., Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Finance Agency,

310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962). (P. 651.)
38 Professor Krasnowieeki raises this point in note 1 at page 656.
' 9 See the rule enunciated in Florentine v. Town of Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 115
A.2d 328 (1955) (P. 506.), and the history of the extensive litigation summarized
in "Further
Note on Procedural Problems." (Pp. 524-26.)
2
0 Meyers, at 746.
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cedure is representative, 2 ' and helps demonstrate the importance of
Professor Krasnowiecki's concern with procedure.
The zoning chapter deserves more attention than Professor Meyers
has given it. Professor Krasnowiecki rejects an historical approachthe zoning "power," including a discussion of Euclid,' is given brief
textual treatment. 23 Instead, he concentrates on the functional relationship of zoning to planning for contemporary land use. The material
emphasizes the dynamic aspects of a zoning mechanism which responds
favorably to requested changes in the planned zones.2 ' The Eves
case 2 provides a starting point for discussion of the extremely complex
problems of prediction and flexibility and of the need for control of
arbitrary action, all of which are inherent in the planning aspect of
zoning theory.
The foregoing examples indicate that Professor Krasnowiecki's
entire book (not merely the chapters on real covenants, equitable
servitudes and easements) 26 develops an overview of property law
which forces the student to focus on both the difficulties which the
conventional rules cause in contemporary situations, and the need
for effective remedial procedures to prevent property interests from
being emasculated by delay and metaphysical concentration on "rights."
This is not to say that the book is perfect. The material on
future interests is too limited to serve any real purpose and is best left
for advanced courses.2 7 The alternative-to include considerably more
material on future interests, which could be studied in depth at the
expense of "modern" materials-is a much less desirable solution.
Despite these limitations, however, many of Professor Meyers' criticisms seem rather extreme, and, at times, mistaken or misguided."3
21

Florentine, supra note 19, is a Connecticut case.

22Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

(Pp. 479-82.)
The textual treatment of the zoning-planning relationship, which introduces
the zoning cases, raises the problem of incentive which flexibly designed zoning
can solve.
(Pp. 487-92.)
25
Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). (P. 492.)
26 Meyers, at 748.
27 Professor Krasnowiecki omits chapter XIV in his own first year course. In
light of the immediate disclaimer of any intention to teach legal history, see p. 1,
Professor Meyers' supposition that such a purpose might underlie chapter XIV,
Meyers, at 744, is an unwarranted straw man. A similarly apologetic disclaimer
prefaces that chapter as well. (P. 354.)
28This is aside from Professor Meyers' rather surprisingly extensive discussion
of typographical errors, printer's mistakes, and hasty galley reading, all of which
were at least in part due to a tight publication schedule which aimed at having the
book ready in time for the start of first year classes. Some of Professor Meyers'
corrections are of questionable validity, see note 4 supra. Others are not entirely
fair. For example, contrary to Professor Meyers' suggestion, Meyers, at 748, the
assertion that legal interests in land were generally not devisable prior to 1540 has
often been made, see, e.g., P. MECHEMX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS
231 (1958); C. MOYNIAXN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW or REAL PROPERTY 174
(1962), and is not disproved by, nor inconsistent with, the concomitant practice
of conveying land to uses in order to enable the cestid que use to will his equitable
interest. Rather, "[t]he purpose of such conveyances frequently was to enable the
landowners to deal with their lands in a manner not countenanced by the common
law or to evade the liabilities incident to legal ownership." Id. Thus, the fact
23
24
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Professor Meyers' critique of the book's treatment of Shelley v.
Kraemer 9 is hard to support. Shelley involves complex constitutional issues which a first year student, viewing them out of the
context of more severe constitutional analysis, is unlikely to grasp.
Its treatment in a property course would seem optional at best. In
any event, this hardly seems the place for in-depth constitutional study.
The question which Professor Meyers considers one "of policy-to
what extent the state can lend its support to an individual's desire
to practice racial discrimination" 3 -- is not in the first instance a
question of policy at all. It is one of constitutional law.
Moreover, the questions which Professor Krasnowiecki poses after
Shelley " are not merely evidentiary, as Professor Meyers suggests, but
rather are consistent with the theory that underlies the entire course
as Professor Krasnowiecki sees it. These problems force the student to
focus on the extent to which the right which the Court guarantees in
Shelley and in Barrows32 can be implemented. Resolution of these
questions appropriately must be in terms of property interests, not
constitutional rights. It is essential to note that similar analysis can
be elicited by comparing the obviously technical basis for the decision
in Barringer3 with the case which follows it, Capitol Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Smith,3 which implements Shelley and Barrows by
quieting the title of Negro plaintiffs who were conveyed property
despite a discriminatory covenant to which their predecessors in title
had agreed. Smith hardly seems constitutionally compelled; an argument could even be made that Shelley, which holds the covenant itself
constitutionally valid, dictates the opposite result. Rather, Smith
represents a pragmatic property-law implementation of the right which
Shelley guarantees at the constitutional level, and it is this type of
remains that "[p]rior to 1540 the feudal system of land tenures was held to forbid
wills of land, save by special custom in certain localities, though this prohibition was
to a certain extent evaded in equity by uses." P. MECHEm & T. ATxINSON, CASES
See also
AND MATERIALS ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 138 n.1 (5th ed. 1961).
2 F. PoLLocK, & F. MATrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISHr LAW 326-30 (2d ed. 1952),
which is cited by Professor Krasnowiecki at page 8 n.13 in support of his textual
assertion. Indeed, Professor Meyers' criticism is particularly difficult to understand
since the fact that "the use could do duty as a will" is explicitly recognized by Professor Krasnowiecki at page 357 of his book.
Moreover, should not Professor Krasnowiecki's shorthand description of primogeniture on page 19, Meyers, at 748, be read in light of the more complete definition
which precedes it on page 8? Is it not clear that the "the California court!' mentioned
on page 194, Meyers, at 748, is a lower court, since the citation to "Cal. App. 2d
Supp." immediately follows the case name? Would it be harmful for a student to
solve the problem presented by the "string citation" at page 444?
None of the above make Professor Krasnowiecki's work a better book; but if
they detract at all from its value as a teaching tool, it is hardly to the extent which
Professor Meyers' emphasis would indicate.
29334
U.S. 1 (1948). (P. 821.)
3
0 Meyers, at 745 (emphasis added).
31
32 (Pp. 832-33.)
fBarrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). (P. 831.)
3242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E. 2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
34136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957).
(P. 145.)
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judicial reaction which Professor Krasnowiecki feels should permeate
property law.3 5
Although his interest in fair housing is valid, Professor Meyers'
proposals for the inclusion of tax materials 6 is extremely dubious,
unless law faculties accept the suggestion that basic income tax be
taught in the first year.37 Attempting to teach "just a little tax,"
before students are in any way equipped to deal with the complexities
of the Internal Revenue Code, seems futile at best.3 8
Professor Meyers' criticisms of case selection are also questionable. Inclusion of Picconi v. Carlin39 seems justifiable simply as an
illustration of estoppel in a context relevant to the modern development.
Further, it helps highlight the inadequacy of the rule relied upon in
the Cohen case.'
As to Murray v. Trustees of Lane Seminary,41
it is difficult to take seriously Professor Meyers' statement that "no
first year student should be encouraged to know that workmanship of
such quality is produced by the courts." ' Are the sensibilities of
students so easily offended? And where would casebook editors be
were it not for poorly decided cases?
In sum, Professor Meyers has failed to evaluate the book in light
of Professor Krasnowiecki's overriding purpose in preparing it. Certainly property law could be taught from a perspective other than
Professor Krasnowiecki's, but that question is not discussed. Further,
many of Professor Meyers' criticisms seem to be of questionable
validity and deal with mere technicalities, practically none of which
are relevant to the utility of the book as a pedagogical device. The
fact is that Professor Krasnowiecki's book provides an excellent basis
for a course that causes the student both to learn and to rethink the
rules and policies of modem property law.
35 In any event, it seems relatively unimportant where in the book Shelley is
placed. Turning to the appendix is hardly a great burden for students if the teacher
feels that Shelley should be read before Barringer.
36 Meyers, at 749.
37
See Chommie, Book Review, 116 U. PA. L. Rxv. 358, 368-69 (1967).
38 Professor Krasnowiecki has chosen to teach tax materials in an advanced
course, which students may take after or concurrently with the course in basic income tax.

39 40 NJ. Super. 393, 123 A.2d 87 (L. Div. 1956). (P. 598.)
40 Cohen v. Simpson Real Estate Corp., 385 Pa. 352, 123 A.2d 715 (1956).
(P. 569.)
41140 N.E.2d 577 (C.P. Ohio 1956). (P. 467.)
42
Meyers, at 746.

